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Abstract  
 
Surrogacy raises admittedly a series of concerns, but it is also a reality and, as long as there are persons 
who cannot have children in a different way, this will not change. Its prohibition at a global level is both 
unfeasible and unenforceable, while its non-regulation reads to legal uncertainty. Pragmatic considerations 
call for the regulation of surrogacy; not because pragmatism overrides ethics, but because a good regulation, 
one that balances the interests of all parties involved, not only on paper but also in practice, can successfully 
address most of the concerns about surrogacy. In 2002 Greece was the first European country to introduce 
a comprehensive regulatory scheme for surrogacy, followed by Cyprus in 2015 and Portugal in 2016.  
Drawing mainly on these jurisdictions, the aim of this paper is to shed light into the alternative patterns 
of regulation of surrogacy and point out the chances and pitfalls of such an endeavour. I argue that the main 
points around which a surrogacy regulation should revolve are: allow for gestational surrogacy only; set 
eligibility criteria for both the intended parents and the surrogate; provide for monitoring mechanisms that 
oversee the whole process; establish legal parenthood of the intended parents already at birth. To ensure 
the success of the regulation, the lawmaker should stay clear of too restrictive or practicably unenforceable 
rules. 
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A. INTRODUCTION: WHY ADOPT A REGULATORY SCHEME? 
I. Surrogacy as a controversial issue 
Surrogacy is admittedly one of the most controversial forms of medically assisted reproduction. The 
concerns are numerous and vary from ethical objections to the use of a person as a means rather as an end 
in itself and to the commodification of reproduction, to policy considerations on the protection of the 
vulnerable from exploitation and to difficulties of a psychological, or even practical, nature regarding the 
surrogate’s obligation to hand over the child.1  
These concerns have led many countries to prohibit surrogacy. This choice though has given rise, 
inevitably, to fertility tourism, which in turn raises intractable problems of private international law.2 Other 
jurisdictions, often on the basis of the very same concerns, refrain from the regulation of the issue and adopt 
a neutral stance.3 This, however, places the legal system equally under strain. Courts have shown creativity,4 
but this is not always enough to tackle typical problems that may arise. What if the surrogate does not hand 
over the child to the intended parents? What if the intended parents no longer wish to take over the child? 
Such issues cannot be effectively regulated contractually, given that in most countries the provisions on 
descent and adoption consist of mandatory rules.  
The case law of European Court of Human Rights makes one thing clear: the best interests of the 
children born from surrogates are always to be safeguarded. This may call for the recognition of the intended 
parents as legal parents of the child, at least if there exist genetic bonds.5 Apart from that, no agreement 
                                                 
1 For a concise presentation of these concerns see L. Brunet/J. Carruthers/K. Davaki/D. King/C. Marzo/C. 
McCandless, A Comparative Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EU States, Project Report. European Parliament 
Directorate General for Internal Policies, 2013, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2013/474403/IPOL-JURI_ET(2013)474403_EN.pdf, pp. 22 
ff. See also the (English) Report of the Committee on Inquiry into Human Fertilization and Embryology (Warnock 
report) 1984 (available at: 
http://www.bioeticacs.org/iceb/documentos/Warnock_Report_of_the_Committee_of_Inquiry_into_Human_Fertilisa
tion_and_Embryology_1984.pdf ), paras. 8.10-8.12. 
2 This is the case e.g. in France and in Germany. See, among others, L. Perrreau-Saussine/N. Sauvage, ‘France’, in K. 
Trimmings/P. Beaumont (eds.), International Surrogacy Arrangements, Hart Publishing, Oxford 2013, p. 119 ff, and 
S.L. Gössl, ‘Germany’, ibid., p. 131 ff.; T. Helms, Künstliche Fortpflanzung und Internationales Privatrecht, in in 
Dutta/D. Schwab/P. Gottwald/D. Henrich/M. Löhnig (eds.), Künstliche Fortpflanzung und Europäisches Familienrecht, 
Gieseking Verlag, Bielefeld 2015, pp. 59 ff.; K. Trimmings/P. Beaumont, Parentage and surrogacy in a European 
perspective, in J.M.Scherpe, European Family Law, Vol. 3. Family Law in a European Perspective, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham 2016, pp. 232 ff, at 271. See also see HCCH, A Preliminary Report on the Issues Arising from 
International Surrogacy Arrangements, Prel. Doc. n. 10, March 2012, esp. paras. 31 ff. 
3 This is the case e.g. in Belgium and in the Netherlands. See G. Verschelden/J. Verhellen, ‘Belgium’, in K. 
Trimmings/P. Beaumont, fn. 2, pp. 49 ff.; W. Pintens, Künstliche Fortpflanzung im belgischen und französischen 
Recht, in Dutta/D. Schwab/P. Gottwald/D. Henrich/M. Löhnig, fn. 2, pp. 105 ff. at 121 and 125; I. Curry-Sumner/M. 
Vonk, in K. Trimmings/P. Beaumont, fn. 2, ‘The Netherlands’, pp. 273 ff.; P.M. Reuß, Künstliche Fortpflanzung im 
niederländischen Recht, in Dutta/D. Schwab/P. Gottwald/D. Henrich/M. Löhnig, fn. 2, pp. 127 ff. at 134 ff. 
4 See W. Pintens, fn. 3 and P.M. Reuß, fn. 3; K. Trimmings/P. Beaumont, fn. 5, p. 270.  
5 See the decision of the ECtHR of 26.6.2014 in Mennesson v. France and Labassee v. France, para. 100. The ECtHR 
followed the same line of argumentation in the judgments Foulon v. France and Bouvet v. France of 21.7.2016 as 
well as in Laborie v. France of 19.1.2017. Cf. Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy, where no such biological bonds 
existed between the intended parents and the child. An explicit ruling on this issue is expected in the pending cases 
Saenz and Saenz-Cortes v. France and Braun v. France. See on this issue, however, the critical approach of C. Fenton-
Glynn, International Surrogacy before the European Court of Human Rights, Journal of Private International Law 13 
(2017), pp. 546-567. 
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seems to exist at an international and supra national level.6 In December 2015 the European Parliament in 
its Resolution “on the Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World 2014 and the European 
Union’s Policy on the Matter” condemned (for profit) surrogacy.7 Less than a year later, the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe rejected, in a close vote, the draft Recommendation of the Committee 
on Social Affairs, Health and Sustainable Development on “Children’s rights related to surrogacy”,8  that 
suggested to “consider the desirability and feasibility of drawing up European guidelines to safeguard 
children’s and women’s right in relation to surrogacy”.9 Most recently, the Report of the UN Special 
Rapporteur 2018 “on the Sale and Sexual Exploitation of Children”, in effect draws parallels between 
surrogacy and the sale of children.10 
 
II. The path to pragmatism 
A market for surrogacy does exist and there are no reasons to believe this will stop being the case any 
time soon. A prohibition of surrogacy on a global level is both unfeasible and unenforceable. There can 
further be little doubt that a regulated market is preferable to a black market. Thus pragmatic considerations 
call for a comprehensive regulation of surrogacy, balancing the interest of all parties involved and especially 
safeguarding the interests of the surrogates and of the children born through surrogacy.  
Drawn by such pragmatic concerns,11 England was the first European country to introduce provisions 
on surrogacy, but the regulatory framework, which is currently under revision,12 is far from comprehensive. 
It effectively permits altruistic surrogacy but does not set forth its conditions.13 What is closer regulated is 
the transfer of legal parenthood to the intended parents after the child has been born.14  
The first EU country to introduce a comprehensive regulatory framework on surrogacy was, 
surprisingly enough, Greece. Notwithstanding remote reactions from the church, in December 2002, the 
Greek Parliament, voted unanimously for the Bill on Medically Assisted Reproduction that among others, 
regulated altruistic gestational surrogacy.15 As stated in the Explanatory Memorandum of the law, the 
                                                 
6 See also L. Brunet/J. Carruthers/K. Davaki/D. King/C. Marzo/C. McCandless, fn. 1, pp. 194 ff.  
7 Resolution of 17.12.2015, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A8-2015-0344+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN, para. 114. 
8 Doc 14140 available at http://semantic-
pace.net/tools/pdf.aspx?doc=aHR0cDovL2Fzc2VtYmx5LmNvZS5pbnQvbncveG1sL1hSZWYvWDJILURXLWV4
dHIuYXNwP2ZpbGVpZD0yMzAxNSZsYW5nPUVO&xsl=aHR0cDovL3NlbWFudGljcGFjZS5uZXQvWHNsdC9
QZGYvWFJlZi1XRC1BVC1YTUwyUERGLnhzbA==&xsltparams=ZmlsZWlkPTIzMDE1.  
9 Vote of 11.10.2016 (83 against - 77 in favour). The sentence quoted is as amended by the first amendment and sub-
amendment. The initial version of the first amendment also condemned all forms of surrogacy. See 
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-AMDetails-EN.asp?FileID=23015&amid=23088&lang=EN.  
10 A/HRC/37/60 of 15.1.2018, esp. paras. 22 ff. and 41 ff. 
11 See esp. paras. 8.18-8.20 of the Warnock report 1984. 
12 The revision of the law on surrogacy has been included in the 13th Programme consultation. See 
https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/surrogacy.  
13 See section 2 of Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 (c. 49), as amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act 2008. 
14 See esp. section 54 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (c. 22) as well as the Embryology (Parental 
Orders) Regulations 2010 (SI 2010/985).  
15 Law 3089/2002 on Medically Assisted Reproduction, Government Gazette, issue A, nr. 327 of 23 December 2002. 
Law 3089/2002 introduced a special chapter in the Greek Civil Code setting the conditions for medically assisted 
reproduction (Arts. 1455-1460 of the Greek Civil Code - hereinafter: GrCC), while it also amended accordingly the 
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regulation of surrogacy has been preferred to its prohibition, in the best interest of the children that would 
be born by surrogates anyway.16 Subsequent provisions complemented the relevant regulatory framework.17 
On the basis of the number of court rulings that have authorized surrogacy procedures (as required by law 
in all cases of surrogacy)18 it is estimated that hundreds of children have been born by surrogates in the last 
15 years, while there do not seem to exist many cases of surrogacy arrangements undertaken in other 
jurisdictions.19 The regulation is regarded as a success, social acceptance of surrogacy is high, and the main 
issue of controversy nowadays is whether single men should have access to it.20 
Few other jurisdictions in the EU have adopted a comprehensive regulatory scheme on surrogacy. In 
May 2015 Cyprus followed the example of Greece, but with more reluctant steps. The law provides that 
surrogacy procedures have to be authorized twice, by different bodies;21 its initial text has been already 
amended twice, while the provisions on surrogacy were suspended by law22 from December 201523 until 
September 2017.24 Portugal followed the same road, but it has been a rocky one. After the President vetoed 
the initial version of the law, of May 2016, that permitted altruistic gestational surrogacy,25 the Parliament 
voted a revised version in August 2016.26 In July 2017 a Presidential Decree further concretized the 
                                                 
rules on maternal and paternal descent (Art 2 of Law 3089/2002 amended Arts. 1464, 1465, 1471, 1475, 1478 und 
1479 GrCC).  
16 See the Explanatory Memorandum of Law 3089/2002, available at www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/2f026f42-
950c-4efc-b950-340c4fb76a24/i-human-eisig.pdf, point Ι 4 (p. 1). 
17 Law 3305/2205 on Specific Issues of the Application of Medically Assisted Reproduction Methods, the Donation 
of Genetic Material and its Cryopreservation as well as on the Establishment and Operation of Medical Centres on 
Assisted Reproduction Government Gazette, issue A, nr. 17 of 27 January 2005; Code of Ethics of Medically Assisted 
Reproduction, Government Gazette issue B, nr. 293 of 7 February 2017.  
18 See below section B V 1. 
19 In published court decisions only one, very problematic, such case is documented. This is the decision 7013/2013 
of the Single-member Court of First Instance of Thessaloniki, Efarmoges Astikou Dikaiou 2013, 337, commented by 
K. Pantelidou. In this, a woman, after the death of her son, commissioned two surrogates in Russia who, using the 
sperm of the deceased and their own ova, gave birth to four children in total. The intended mother (who was actually 
the genetic grandmother) then adopted the children and filed a request before a Greek court for the recognition of the 
relevant Russian court ruling. The Greek court denied the request on the grounds that the Russian judgment 
contravened the Greek ordre public. Indeed, the procedure followed in the case in question deviated considerably 
from basic principles of the Greek legislation on both surrogacy and for post mortem fertilization (for surrogacy see 
below; for post mortem fertilization see Art. 1457 GrCC).  
20 See in more detail below section  B III 1 a i. 
21 Law 69(I)/2015 on the Application of Medically Assisted Reproduction (Basic Law), Official Gazette nr. 4510 of 
15 May 2015, was amended by Law 194(I)/2015, Official Gazette nr. 4545 of 17 December 2015 and Law 92(I)/2016 
Official Gazette nr. 4573 of 29 July 2016. In what follows, reference is made to the revised version of the Basic Law, 
unless otherwise indicated. 
22 See Art. 5 of Law 194(I)/2015 that amended Art. 53 of the Basic Law. 
23 A remarkable coincidence is that the Cypriot law that suspended the provisions on surrogacy was published in the 
Official Gazette on the very same day the European Parliament condemned surrogacy. See fn. 7 and 21. 
24 See Governmental Decision nr. 83.255 of 6 September 2017, published in the Official Gazette nr. 4548 of 15 
September 2017.  
25 See, in English, https://medicalxpress.com/news/2016-06-portugese-vetos-surrogacy-law.html.  
26 Law 25/2016, on the Regulation and Access to Surrogacy, Diário da República nr. 160/2016, series I of 22 August 
2016 that amended Law 32/2006 on Medically Assisted Reproduction, Diário da República nr. 143/2006, series I of 
26 July 2006. In what follows, reference is made to the revised version of Law 32/2006.  
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provisions of the law.27 In April 2018, however, the Portuguese Constitutional Court declared some of the 
provisions unconstitutional.28 In spite of the legal uncertainty that this brings about, it has been welcomed 
as good news in that the Constitutional Court accepted the permissibility of surrogacy in principle and 
declared unconstitutional only specific provisions.29  
The aim of this paper is to shed light into the alternative patterns of regulation of surrogacy, proceed 
to their evaluation and point out the chances and pitfalls of such an endeavor. The analysis draws mainly 
on the three aforementioned EU jurisdictions that have adopted a comprehensive regulation on surrogacy, 
i.e. Greece, Cyprus and Portugal.30  
 
B. MAPPING A COMPREHENSIVE REGULATORY SCHEME: A CRITICAL 
OVERVIEW OF THE ALTERNATIVES 
I. General remarks 
Once the lawmaker decides to regulate surrogacy, he/she has to confront two basic dilemmas: 
Altruistic or commercial surrogacy? Gestational or traditional surrogacy? These decisions set the main 
features of the surrogacy regime and are decisive for the conformation of the whole regulatory scheme. 
Hence their discussion precedes the rest of the analysis. I then identify the main areas of regulation within 
a comprehensive regulatory scheme on surrogacy as follows: The subjects of the procedure and the genetic 
material to be used, the agreement between the commissioning parents and the surrogate, the initiation of 
control mechanisms to ensure the regulation is correctly implemented, and the adoption of rules on the 
consequences of surrogacy, especially as to the legal parenthood of the children to be born. Given that 
surrogacy as a method of medically assisted reproduction also involves the performance of medical acts, 
the analysis would not be complete without a reference to the physician’s obligation to inform the parties 
involved on the procedure. As in every comparative endeavour, it has not been possible to go into detail in 
all issues that arise, so I had to content myself with enough to paint the broader picture. 
 
II. Types of surrogacy 
 
1. Altruistic v. commercial surrogacy 
Unlike commercial surrogacy, in altruistic surrogacy the surrogate does not receive remuneration for 
her services. All three EU jurisdictions with a comprehensive regulatory scheme on surrogacy opt for 
altruistic surrogacy31 and criminalize commercial surrogacy.32 Altruistic surrogacy could be somehow 
                                                 
27 Regulatory Decree nr. 6/2017, Diário da República nr. 146/2017, Series I of 31July 2017. 
28 Decision 225/2018 of 24 April 2018, Diário da República nr. 87/2018, Series I of 7 May 2018. See in more detail 
below, esp. sections B IV 2 and B VI. 
29 See T. Violante, (Not) striking down surrogate motherhood in Portugal, available at: https://verfassungsblog.de/not-
striking-down-surrogate-motherhood-in-portugal/.  
30 Cypriot and Portuguese law have been taken into consideration to the extent possible, given that relevant literature 
on Cypriot law is scarce, while the same holds for Portuguese literature in English. 
31 See for Greece Art. 1458 GrCC; for Cyprus see Art. 22 para. 1 of Law 69(I)/2015; for Portugal see Art. 8 para. 2 of 
Law 32/2006. 
32 For Greece see Art. 26 para. 8 Law 3305/2005; for Cyprus see Art. 26 para. 6 of Law 69(I)/2015; for Portugal see 
Art. 39 of Law 32/2006. It is worth noting that the initial Greek draft of the Greek Law on Medically Assisted 
Reproduction did not explicitly prohibit commercial surrogacy. The relevant provision had been inserted during the 
discussions in the Parliament, while Law 3305/2005 criminalized it, almost two years after the initial regulation of 
surrogacy. Even so, though, there seemed to exist a consensus within the members of the Drafting Committee of the 
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safeguarded if surrogacy were permissible only in cases where the surrogate has been a close relative of the 
commissioning parents.33 This possibility had been considered in Portugal, but did not prevail.34 Indeed it 
would narrow down exceedingly the scope of application of the regulation.35 Once the surrogate is not 
related to the intended parents, thorny issues arise as to her compensation. 
All jurisdictions examined accept that within a regime of altruistic surrogacy there is room for 
compensation of the surrogate for any expenses she may incur.36 This is evident as to her actual costs, such 
as medical or travel expenses. In an effort to preserve the altruistic character of surrogacy the Portuguese 
provisions are particularly strict on this point. The law explicitly states that only such expenses can be 
reimbursed, provided they are demonstrated by receipts, invoices or other relevant documents.37  
In Greece and Cyprus it is further accepted that the surrogate can be also compensated for her lost 
income during pregnancy and the first few weeks after birth, or even, in the case of Greece, for her 
hypothetical lost income, if she is currently unemployed.38 The situation becomes thus more complex, since 
such provisions actually open the back door to commercial surrogacy.39 In an effort to preserve the altruistic 
character of surrogacy, in Greece, the National Authority of Assisted Reproduction issued a decision 
according to which the amount granted to the surrogate as compensation cannot exceed 10.000 euros.40 A 
                                                 
initial law, that commercial surrogacy contracts would be considered immoral and therefore void. See in more detail 
A. Hatzis, From Soft to Hard Paternalism and Back: The Regulation of Surrogate Motherhood in Greece, Portuguese 
Economic Journal 2009, 205-220, at 214-215.  
33 Such cases though (e.g. where a mother carries the baby for her daughter) may give rise to confusion and 
complications within the family. It is presumably on this basis that according to Israeli law it is prohibited for the 
surrogate to be related to the intended parents. See A. Benshushan/J.G. Schenker, Legitimizing surrogacy in Israel, 
Human Reproduction 1997, 1832-1834 at 1832; L. Ben-Nun, Surrogate motherhood, B. N. Publication House, Israel 
2014, at 68. 
34 See V.L. Raposo, The New Portuguese Law on Surrogacy - The Story of How a Promising Law does not Really 
Regulate Surrogacy Arrangements, 21 JBRA Assisted Reproduction 2017, pp. 230-239, at 231. 
35 Greek statistics on surrogacy support this point. See P. Ravdas, ‘Surrogate Motherhood in Greece: Statistical Data 
Derived from Court Decisions’, BIOETHICA 2017/2, available online at: 
http://www.bioethics.gr/images/pdf/JOURNAL/BIOETHICA_Vol_3_Issue_2_FINAL.pdf, pp. 40-58 at 55, who 
notes that, from a total of 256 court rulings that authorized surrogacy in the years 2003-2016 and were assessed in this 
study, only in around 18% of the cases the intended mother and the surrogate were related.  
36 See also the definition of altruistic surrogacy in the Glossary annexed to the Preliminary Document 3b of the Hague 
Conference Project on Legal Parentage and Surrogacy of 2014 (Annex A), available at 
https://assets.hcch.net/docs/6403eddb-3b47-4680-ba4a-3fe3e11c0557.pdf, according to which altruistic surrogacy is 
“a surrogacy arrangement where the intending parent(s) pay the surrogate nothing or, more usually, only for her 
‘reasonable expenses‘ associated with the surrogacy”. This definition is also shared by the UN Special Rapporteur in 
the 2018 Report, fn. 10, para. 39, that also adds that the expenses should be itemized. 
37 See Art. 8 para. 5 of Law 25/2016. 
38 For Greece see Art. 13 para. 4 of Law 3305/2005; for Cyprus see Art. 22 para. 6 of Law 69(I)/2015. 
39 As to the terminology, it is worth noting that the Glossary annexed to the Preliminary Document 3b of the HCCH 
Project on Legal Parentage and Surrogacy (fn. 36) has substituted the term ‘commercial surrogacy’ with the term ‘for 
profit surrogacy’. As stated in the said document “it is often difficult to draw the line between what is an altruistic 
surrogacy arrangement and what is a for profit arrangement. For example, if a surrogate is unemployed prior to 
conception but can claim ‘reasonable expenses’, including loss of earnings, for the arrangement, is this arrangement 
still ‘altruistic’?” This view is shared by the UN Special Rapporteur, fn. 10, para. 39, who also notes that the expensed 
should be itemized.  
40 See Art. 4 of the decision 36/2008 of the National Authority of Assisted Reproduction, Government Gazette, issue 
B, nr. 670 of 16 April 2008. 
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relevant decision is also awaited in Cyprus.41 In practice, though, there are sound reasons to believe that the 
amount actually paid to surrogates well exceeds the provision of the law.42 In Greece journalistic sources 
mention that the remuneration of surrogates is actually around 50.000 euros.43 Such an agreement of the 
parties is undoubtedly void, but once the commissioning parents make the payment to the surrogate, usually 
in advance, they cannot claim it back, because the cause of the payment is considered immoral and the 
intended parents had their share in this immorality.44 
 From a look into the Greek court rulings that authorize surrogacy, it can be seen that the 
commissioning parents often claim before the court that the surrogate is their “best friend”.45 In many cases, 
though, this is doubtful. According to a recent empirical study on court rulings on surrogacy in around two 
thirds of the cases the surrogates are foreign nationals, especially eastern Europeans, who reside in Greece.46 
At the same time the courts do not exhibit any zeal in finding out the true nature of the relations of the 
parties of the agreement.47  
On this basis, in Greece the voices in favour of commercial surrogacy seem to become louder lately.48 
As it is convincingly stated, ethical arguments regarding the instrumentalization of the surrogate and 
psychological arguments referring to the bond between the surrogate and the child are equally valid against 
both altruistic and commercial surrogacy. If the lawmaker has overcome these issues and has decided to 
regulate surrogacy, there are no convincing arguments why this should be only in the altruistic form.49 A 
surrogacy agreement does not become immoral just because a fee is granted to the surrogate for her services 
(not ‘for selling her child’).50 In addition there can be little doubt that surrogates are less prone to 
exploitation when they are paid on a basis of a valid contract, controlled by a judge, rather than under the 
                                                 
41 Art. 22 para 7 α of Law 69 (I)/2015 provides that α maximum amount will be set by Ministerial Decree, after a 
proposal of the Cypriot Council of Medically Assisted Reproduction.  
42 For Greece see on this issue Z. Papaligoura/D. Papadatou/T. Bellali, Surrogacy: The Experience of Greek 
Commissioning Women, Women and Birth 2015, 110-118 at 116. 
43 According to P. Tsimpoukis, Surrogate Motherhood, in the daily newspaper Proto Thema of 30.1.2016 (available 
at: https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/549154/sunehos-kerdizei-edafos-i-parentheti-mitrotita-stin-ellada/ - in 
Greek) the amount granted in Greece to the surrogate  is between 50.000 and 70.000 Euros. According to the article 
of I. Fotiadi, ‘Greek Industry with surrogates’, in the daily newspaper Kathimerini of 13.04.2014 (available at: 
http://www.kathimerini.gr/762582/article/epikairothta/ellada/ellhnikh-viomhxania-me-paren8etes-mhteres - in 
Greek) this amount is between 20.000 and. 40.000 Euros.  
44 See Art. 907 GrCC. 
45 According to the study of P. Ravdas, fn. 35, p. 55 the intended mother and the surrogate claimed that they were best 
friends in almost 40% of the cases. These results are also confirmed by further relevant studies. See A. Hatzis, The 
Regulation of Surrogate Motherhood in Greece, 2010, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1689774, p. 11 as well as the study by Kokkinaki, referred to by 
D. Papadopoulou-Klamari, ‘Post Mortem Artificial Insemination and Surrogacy in Practice’ in Assisted Reproduction 
in Europe: Social, Ethical and Legal Issues, Sakkoulas, Athens/Thessaloniki 2015, pp. 117 ff. at 121 ff. (in Greek) at 
123.  
46 See P. Ravdas, fn. 35, pp. 52 as well as A. Hatzis, fn. 45 and the study of Kokkinaki, referred to by D. Papadopoulou-
Klamari, fn. 45. 
47 See also T. Vidalis, Surrogacy “Tourism”, pp. 113-118 (also available at 
https://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/culres/article/download/4956/4921) at 115. 
48 See esp. T. Vidalis, fn. 47, esp. at 117; A. Hatzis, fn. 32, at 216 ff.  
49 See T. Vidalis, fn. 47, at 116. 
50 See T. Vidalis fn. 47 at 117; A. Hatzis, fn. 32, at 209. Cf however, on this issue the report of the UN Special 
Rapporteur, fn. 10, para. 39 and 41 et seq., who nonetheless (in para. 72) acknowledges that commercial surrogacy 
does not necessarily amount to sale of children if it is properly regulated. 
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table. Finally, given the despair of the commissioning parents the surrogate is not necessarily the weak 
party of the agreement.51 
 
2. Gestational v. traditional surrogacy 
The difference between gestational and traditional surrogacy lies on the gametes used. If the embryo 
carried by the surrogate is genetically related to her, surrogacy is traditional,52 if not, gestational.53 In 
medical terms, traditional surrogacy presents advantages over gestational surrogacy.54 Ethically and also 
psychologically for the surrogate, however, the issues that arise in traditional surrogacy are clearly thornier, 
since the child to be born is also genetically the child of the surrogate.  
While in certain jurisdictions, such as England and California,55 traditional surrogacy is a legal option, 
all European jurisdictions with comprehensive regulation of surrogacy examined opt for gestational 
surrogacy.56 This choice can be linked to the regulation of the legal consequences of surrogacy. Unlike 
England, where the intended parents become legal parents only once they acquire a parental order, with the 
consent of the surrogate, after the child has been born,57 in Greece, Cyprus and Portugal, intended parents 
are the legal parents of the child already at birth.58 Such a rule presents undeniable advantages59 but can be 
indeed considered morally justifiable and psychologically bearable only when the surrogate provides no 
more than child-bearing services.60 Along these lines, if the surrogate is the genetic mother of the child, the 
legal motherhood of the intended mother can be challenged, under Greek and Cypriot law, but no such 
provision exists in Portugal.61  
 
III. The persons and the gametes 
 
1. Subjects of the procedure 
 
a. Commissioning parents 
 
                                                 
51 See T. Vidalis, fn. 47 at 117. 
52 In traditional surrogacy natural conception is also possible. Such instances can be traced back to biblical times. See 
in brief on this issue HCCH, Preliminary Report, fn. 2, para. 4 fn. 17. 
53 See also the relevant definitions in the Glossary annexed to the Preliminary document 3b of 2014, fn. 36.  
54 See, among others, D. Beeson/A. Lippman, Gestational Surrogacy: How safe?, in M. Davies (ed.), Babies for Sale. 
Transnational Surrogacy, Human Rights and the Politics of Reproduction, Zed Books, London 2017, pp. 82-104, esp. 
at 83.  
55 For England see, instead of others, the information provided by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, 
at https://www.hfea.gov.uk/treatments/explore-all-treatments/surrogacy/. For California see among others D.M. 
Goodmann, Parentage, in T.B. Haet/J.E. Heywood, Practice under the California Family Code, CEB 2017, p. 414 as 
well as M. Kinley, The Requirement for a Valid Surrogacy Parentage Contract in California, available at 
http://californiahealthcarelaw.com/?p=526.  
56 For Greece see Art. 1458 sent. 1 GrCC; for Cyprus see Art. 22 para. 1 and 23 para. 1 of Law 69(I)/2015; for Portugal 
see Art. 8 para. 3 of Law 32/2006.  
57 See Art. 54 of the HFEA 2008. 
58 See in more detail below section B VI 1.  
59 Ibid. 
60 See on this issue in more detail T. Trokanas, Human Reproduction. Private Autonomy and its Limits, Sakkoulas, 
Athens/Thessaloniki 2011, pp. 372-373 (in Greek), with further references.  
61 See in more detail below, section B VI 1. 
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i. Personal status of persons being granted access to surrogacy 
All jurisdictions examined provide access to surrogacy to heterosexual couples, married or not, as well 
as to single women, although the latter is still rather unclear in Portugal.62 When it comes to same-sex 
couples, the regulation is generally less favourable. Both Greece and Cyprus finally recognized legally 
same-sex couples in 2015,63 but did not grant them parental rights as a couple. In other words, Greek and 
Cypriot law does not accept the possibility of same sex parents.64 In Portugal, on the other hand, same-sex 
couples have the right to marry since 2010 and can adopt children since 2016.65 Female same-sex couples 
may also proceed to surrogacy unlike male same-sex couples or single men.66  
The question whether single men can proceed to surrogacy has been long debated in Greece, since the 
law does not explicitly regulate the issue. 67 In two cases of single men the courts approved surrogacy on 
the grounds of non-discrimination on the basis of sex.68 This approach finds also strong support in the legal 
                                                 
62 For Greece see Art. 1458 GrCC, in combination with Art. 1456 GrCC; for Cyprus see Art. 22 of Law 69(I)/2015, 
interpreted in accordance to Art. 21 para. 5 of the same law, as amended by Art. 6 (b) Law 92(I)/2016. See on this 
issue T. Trokanas, The Cypriot Law of Medically Assisted Reproduction, Sakkoulas, Athens/Thessaloniki 2016, p. 
131 (in Greek). In Portugal, Art. 6 of Law 32/2006 grants single women access to medically assisted reproduction, 
but the provisions on surrogacy (Art. 8 of the same law, as amended) refer only to couples. This is an issue of the 
interpretation of the law that has still not been answered by case law. See V.L. Raposo, fn. 34, at p. 231. 
63 See the Greek Law 4356/2015, Government Gazette, Issue A, nr. 181 of 24 December 2015, and the Cypriot Law 
184(I)/2015, Official Gazette nr. 4543 of 9 December 2015 respectively, on registered partnerships. 
64 It is worth noting, though, that in Greece, according to Art. 8 para. 1 of Law 4538/2018 on Foster Care and Adoption, 
Government Gazette, issue A, nr. 85 of 16 May 2018, same-sex couples can act as foster parents. For Cyprus see T. 
Trokanas, fn. 62, pp. 84-85.  
65 See Laws 9/2010, Diário da República nr. 105/2010, Series I of 31 May 2010 and 2/2016 Diário da República nr. 
41/2016, Series I of 29 February 2016 respectively. 
66 See V.L. Raposo, fn. 34, at 231. 
67 In the Explanatory Memorandum of Law 3089/2002, Point II 1 (p. 3) though, there is a relevant reference of the 
possibility of widowers to proceed to assisted reproduction through surrogacy, with the ova of their late wives, 
provided that the conditions for post mortem reproduction set by law are fulfilled. On these conditions, see Art. 1457 
GrCC and in more detail in English see P. Agallopoulou, ‘Assistant Reproductive Technology: Forcing a Rethink of 
Parenthood in Greek Law’ in B. Feuillet-Liger, K. Orfali and T. Callus (eds.), Reproductive Technology and Changing 
Perceptions of Parenthood around the World, Bruylant, Brussels, 2014, pp. 116 ff. at 133-134. 
68 See decisions 2827/2008 of the Single-member Court of First Instance of Athens, Chronika Idiotikou Dikaiou 2009, 
816 and 13707/2009 of the Single-member Court of First Instance of Thessaloniki, Chronika Idiotikou Dikaiou 2011, 
267.  
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literature.69 In one of these cases though, the States Attorney brought an appeal.70 The Court of Appeals 
then quashed the decision of the Court of First Instance that had granted authorization to surrogacy arguing 
that the goal of the regulation of surrogacy is to redress medical problems that lead to the impossibility of 
pregnancy and not to override nature.71 According to the Court of Appeals, namely, since a man has neither 
ova not a uterus, the reason he is unable to achieve a pregnancy does not constitute a medical problem. The 
afore-mentioned argument though does not really qualify as convincing, since also a single woman, who, 
according to the law, may commission a surrogate, if she is unable to bear a child herself, overrides nature 
to the extent that in such a procedure she is necessarily provided with the element she is missing due to her 
biology, namely with the sperm of a man.72 In Cyprus, the answer to the question is pretty straightforward; 
an amendment of the initial law in 2016 provided access to medically assisted reproduction to single 
persons, without differentiating on the basis of their sex. Hence there is now little doubt that single men are 
also granted access to surrogacy.73  
 
                                                 
69 See I. Spyridakis, The New Regulation of Artificial Reproduction and Kinship, Ant. N. Sakkoulas, Athens/Komotini 
2003, p. 29 (in Greek); idem, Family Law, Ant. N. Sakkoulas, Athens/Komotini 2006, p. 414 (in Greek); T. 
Papachristou, ‘Comment to the Decision 2827/2008 of the Single-member Court of First Instance of Athens’, 
Chronika Idiotikou Dikaiou 2009, 818 (in Greek); N. Koumoutzis in Ap. Georgiades and M. Stathopoulos (eds.), 
Commentary of the Civil Code, Vol. VII, 2nd ed., P.N. Sakkoulas - Dikaio kai Oikonomia, Athens 2007, Art. 1457-
1458 nr. 77 (in Greek); idem, ‘The Artificial Reproduction of the Single Man’, Chronika Idiotikou Dikaiou 2011, 316 
ff. (in Greek); idem, ‘The Artificial Reproduction of Single Persons and the European Convention on Human Rights’ 
in Assisted Reproduction and Alternative Forms of Family, Sakkoulas, Athens/Thessaloniki 2014, pp. 25 ff., esp. p. 
37 (in Greek); E. Kounougeri-Manoledaki, Family Law, 6th ed., Vol. II, Sakkoulas, Athens/Thessaloniki, 2016, pp. 
57-58 (in Greek); idem, ‘Medically Assisted Reproduction: Redefining the Notion of Family’ in Medically Assisted 
Human Reproduction. 10 Years Application of Law 3089/2002, Sakkoulas, Athens/Thessaloniki 2013, pp. 35 ff. at 
47-48 (in Greek); T. Trokanas, fn. 60, p. 222; V. Peraki, in Ap. Georgiades (ed.), Brief Commentary of the Civil Code, 
Vol. II, P.N. Sakkoulas – Dikaio kai Oikonomia, Athens 2013, Art. 1458 nr. 21; P. Agallopoulou, ‘Surrogacy’ in M. 
Kanellopoulou-Boti and F. Panagopoulou-Koutnatzi (eds.), Medical Liability and Bioethics. Contemporary 
Approaches αnd Future Perspectives, Paschalidis, Athens 2014, pp. 173 ff. at 180 (in Greek); cf. Explanatory 
Memorandum of Law 3089/2002, Point II 1 (p. 3); cf. also. I. Androulidaki-Dimitriadi, ‘The Contract for Medically 
Assisted Reproduction’ in Essays in Honour of Apostolos S. Georgiades, Vol. I, Ant. N. Sakkoulas, Athens/Komotini, 
pp. 27 ff. at 31-31 (in Greek). Contra: D. Papadopoulou-Klamari, Kinship. Establishment, Registration, Protection, 
Ant. N. Sakkoulas, Athens/Komotini 2010, pp. 220 ff, esp. at. 224 (in Greek); K. Pantelidou, ‘Non-Discrimination 
and Medically Assisted Human Reproduction’, in Essays in Honour of Penelope Agallopoulou, Vol. II, Ant. N. 
Sakkoulas, Athens/Komotini 2011, pp. 1095 ff., esp. at pp. 1099-1100 (in Greek); P. Nikolopoulos, ‘Comment on the 
Decision 3357/2010 of the Athens Court of Appeals’, Nomiko Vima 2012, 1440 (in Greek); A. Koutsouradis, 
‘Entwicklungen des griechischen Familien- und Erbrechts 2013-2014’, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Familienrecht 
2014, 1509 ff. at 1509. 
70 See Art. 761 of the Greek Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter: GrCCP) according to which in non-adversarial 
proceedings the State Attorney of the Court of First Instance may appeal the decisions of the Court.  
71 See decision 3357/2010 of the Athens Court of Appeals, Nomiko Vima 2012, 1437. See also the recent decision 
8641/2017 of the Court of First Instance of Thessaloniki, published in Efarmoges Astikou Dikaoiu 2017, 925, that 
followed the same argumentation and did not authorize surrogacy for a single man. 
72 See esp. N. Koumoutzis, ‘The Artificial Reproduction of Single Persons and the European Convention on Human 
Rights’ in Assisted Reproduction and Alternative Forms of Family, Sakkoulas, Athens/Thessaloniki 2014, pp. 25 ff., 
esp. pp. 35-36 (in Greek). 
73 See fn. 62. 
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ii. Medical necessity of surrogacy and health screening 
A common principle running through all three European jurisdictions with a comprehensive regulation 
on surrogacy is its subsidiary character: Surrogacy is an option only for persons who cannot have a child in 
the natural way, due to a medical condition, ruling thus out surrogacy for convenience.74 While the Greek 
and Cypriot law do not further concretize the type of conditions that could lead to surrogacy,75 the 
Portuguese provision seems more restrictive in that it specifically refers to women without uterus or with 
an injury or disease of the uterus that hinders pregnancy in an absolute and definite way, or in other clinical 
situations that justify surrogacy.76  
In addition to this, Cypriot law provides that the intended parents shall undergo a psychological 
testing.77 Similarly in Portugal the National Council of Medically Assisted Reproduction may order such 
evaluation, if it is considered necessary.78 In Greece no such provision exists, while part of the Greek 
literature confronts such provision with scepticism on the grounds that there is a thin line between a 
psychological evaluation and social control.79 
  
iii. Age 
Following the general provisions on medically assisted reproduction, the age limit for such procedures 
is set by the age until which reproduction in the natural way would be possible. Greece and Cyprus set this 
limit for women, including intended mothers, at fifty years,80 while no such limit is provided for men. 
Unlike Greek law, Cypriot law provides the possibility to women older than fifty to proceed to methods of 
medically assisted reproduction, including surrogacy, provided that the competent board grants them a 
special permission.81 Age restrictions mean to ensure the parents’ capability to take good care of the child 
that will be born. This corresponds to the child’s best interests, which according to the law are always to be 
taken into account.82 The recent experience with elderly parents in England, who had a child born by a 
surrogate, just to be taken away from social services a year later, justifies this approach.83 
 
                                                 
74 See for Greece Art. 1458 sent. 2 GrCC for surrogacy and Art. 1455 para. 1 sent. 1 GrCC for medically assisted 
reproduction in general; for Cyprus Art. 23 para. 3 (a) on surrogacy and Art. 16 para. 1 for medically assisted 
reproduction in general. For Portugal see Art. 8 para. 2 of Law 32/2006. 
75 This could be e.g. uterine anomalies of the intended mother or her suffering from a serious condition or disease 
which could be transmitted to the fetus, such as HIV. On this issue see Ap. Georgiades, Family Law, Sakkoulas, 
Athens/Thessaloniki, 2nd ed. 2017, § 25 nr. 23 (in Greek).  
76 See fn. 74. 
77 See Art. 23 para. 3 στ of Law 69(I)/2015. This condition is also provided in the Israeli regulation of surrogacy. See 
A. Benshushan/J.G. Schenker, fn. 33, p. 1833.  
78 See Art. 2 para. 9 of Regulatory Decree 6/2017. 
79 See T. Trokanas, fn. 62, at 139-140 with further references. 
80 See Art. 4 para. 1 of Law 3305/2005 for Greece and Art. 21 para. 2 of Law 69(I)/2015 for Cyprus. 
81 See Art. 21 para. 2.  
82 See Art. 1 para. 2 of Law 3305/2005 und also in detail A. Koutsouradis, ‘Issues on Surrogacy, especially after the 
Law 3305/2005’, Nomiko Vima 2006, 337 ff., esp. pp. 355 ff. (in Greek); T. Trokanas, ‘The Application of Methods 
of Assisted Reproduction and the Best Interests of the Child Born’ in T. Papachristou/E. Kounougeri-Manoledaki 
(eds.), Family Law in the 21st Century, Sakkoulas, Athens/Thessaloniki 2012, pp. 135 ff. (in Greek). Similarly for 
Cyprus see Art. 16 para. 5 of Law 69(I)/2015 and T. Trokanas, fn. 62, at 71-73. 
83 See http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5670651/Britains-oldest-parents-using-surrogate-mother-child-taken-
away-social-services.html.  
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iv. Other criteria 
In all jurisdictions under examination, the nationality of the commissioning parents is irrelevant. 
According to the law of Cyprus, though, the commissioning parents should be domiciled in Cyprus.84 
Moreover, Cypriot law provides an additional criterion for the eligibility of intended parents; they should 
not have been condemned for a sexual crime, such as child pornography, rape etc.85 
 
v. The profile of commissioning parents in Greece  
Statistical information on surrogacy in Cyprus and Portugal do not exist yet, since the regulation on 
surrogacy entered into force just a couple of years ago (and in Cyprus it was suspended until September 
2017). In Greece a particularly interesting study was performed on the basis 256 court decisions that granted 
authorization to surrogacy (as required by law in all cases of surrogacy)86 in the years 2003-2016.87 
According to this study the mean age of intended mothers was 40 years old, more than 90% were married 
and more than 95% did not have children of their own. 88 Moreover, 82% of the intended mothers were 
Greek nationals. This can be explained by the fact that until July 2014 a condition for surrogacy in Greece 
was that both the surrogate and the intended parents were domiciled in Greece, discouraging thus fertility 
tourism.89 The situation can be expected to change in the years to come. This tendency can be already seen 
from a small sample, namely from the decisions of the Court of First Instance of Thessaloniki in 2017, 
where 9 out of the 12 authorizations of surrogacy were granted to non-Greek nationals.90 
 
b. Surrogate 
i. Eligibility criteria 
The main criterion for the eligibility of the woman acting as a surrogate is that she is in the physical 
and psychological condition that allows her to bear a child. In all jurisdictions examined the fulfilment of 
this condition is controlled by medical experts on a case to case basis.91  
In Greece since February 2017, when the (binding) Code of Ethics of Medically Assisted Reproduction 
entered into force,92 it is explicitly provided that a woman is eligible as a surrogate if she has already had a 
child of her own and has not undergone more than two caesarean sections.93 While the latter is clearly a 
precaution for the surrogate’s physical health, the former means to safeguard the surrogate’s self-
determination, since a surrogate who has already experienced pregnancy and birth has a better 
understanding of the agreement she enters into. The advantage of this solution has been also pointed out in 
the Portuguese and Cypriot literature as well.94 
                                                 
84 On this issue see in detail below section B III 1 c.  
85 See Art. 23 para. 3 η of Law 69(I)/2015. 
86 See below section B V 1. 
87 See P. Ravdas, fn. 35. 
88 See P. Ravdas, fn. 35 pp. 46-48. 
89 See in more detail below section B III 1 c.  
90 Information based on unpublished decisions of the court. I would like to thank Prof. Koutsouradis for granting me 
access to these decisions.  
91 For Greece see Art. 13 para. 2 of Law 3305/2005; for Cyprus see Art. 23 para. 3 β and στ of Law 69(I)/2015; for 
Portugal see Art. 2 para. 9 of Regulatory Decree 6/2017.  
92 See fn. 17. 
93 See Art. 9 para. 1 of the Code of Ethics of Medically Assisted Reproduction. 
94 For Cyprus see T. Trokanas, fn. 62, p. 141-142; for Portugal see V.L. Raposo, fn. 34, at p. 237. It is worth noting 
that the first jurisdiction that introduced this condition as an eligibility criterion for the surrogate is Israel, but due to 
the fact that, according to the same regulation, the surrogate should be also single, the number of potential surrogates 
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The physical condition of the surrogate is also contingent upon her age. In Cyprus and Portugal the 
law does not explicitly foresee age limits for the surrogate. In Greece, according to Art. 9 of the Code the 
surrogate should be between 25 and 45 years of age.95 This provision, however, in its rigidity has been 
subject to criticism, since it is practically no longer possible for a mother to act as surrogate for her 
daughter.96 A more flexible solution providing the possibility to introduce exceptions to this rule under 
strict conditions would be preferable. 
In all jurisdictions examined, any woman would be in principle eligible as surrogate, irrespective of 
her relations to the commissioning parents.97 A special negative condition for the surrogate is provided in 
Portugal, where the law bars a woman who stands in an employment relation or economic subordination to 
the commissioning parents from acting as a surrogate for them.98  
The marital status of the surrogate is not relevant in any of the three jurisdictions under examination.99 
However, Greek and Cypriot law state explicitly that, if she surrogate is married or has concluded a 
registered partnership, her spouse or partner has to consent to the surrogacy arrangement.100  
Further special negative conditions for the surrogate are provided in Cypriot law. Namely, the non-
conviction for a sexual crime is an eligibility criterion, not only for the intended parents,101 but for the 
surrogate as well.102  
 
ii. The profile of the surrogate in Greece  
According to the aforementioned study performed on court decisions that granted authorization to 
surrogacy in the years 2003-2016,103 the mean age of women acting as surrogates was almost 35 years old. 
Almost half of them were married and more than half had already children of their own. In addition, about 
two thirds of them were foreign nationals, coming mostly from countries of Eastern Europe. It is worth 
noting that the Greek surrogates were in mean older and to greater percentage married, compared to the 
surrogates of foreign nationality. As regards their relations to the intended parents, in around a quarter of 
cases the surrogate has been a relative of the intended mother (usually sister or mother), with the rest being 
either “close friends” of the intended mother104 or previously employed by her (usually as household help 
or nurse).  
 
                                                 
has been excessively limited. See the critical approach to the Israeli regulation by I. Rosenblum, Israel’s Double Game 
on the Surrogacy Issue, The Jerusalem Post, 8.5.2015, available at https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Israels-double-
game-on-the-surrogacy-issue-402477. The concern behind this restriction is that otherwise the impregnation of the 
surrogate with an embryo that is not genetically related to her husband could be considered as adultery. See A. 
Benshushan/J.G. Schenker, fn. 42, at 1832; J. Hand, Surrogacy in Israel: A Model of Comprehensive Regulation of 
New Technologies, Santa Clara Journal of International Law, 2006, pp. 111-116 at 114 and 115.  
95 See Art. 9 para. 1 of the Code of Ethics of Medically Assisted Reproduction. 
96 According to P. Ravdas, fn. 35, p. 55, it was in 4,5% of the cases that a mother carried the child for her daughter. 
97 See also above section B II 1 and fn. 33. 
98 See Art. 8 para. 6 of Law 32/2006. 
99 For Israel see above, fn. 94. 
100 See Art. 1458 GrCC, in combination with Art. 12 of Law 4356/2015, in case of registered partnership. For Cyprus 
see Art. 22 para. 1 of Law 69(I)/2015, in combination with Art. 4 of Law 184(I)/2015, in case of registered partnership. 
101 See above section B III 1 a (v). 
102 See Art. 23 para. 3 η of Law 69(I)/2015. 
103 See P. Ravdas, fn. 35, p. 52. 
104 See on this in more detail fn. 45. 
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c. Territorial constraints in particular 
Cypriot law is the only one that currently foresees territorial restrictions as to surrogacy. Namely 
according to Art. 23 para. 3 (ε) of Law 69(I)/2015, both the intended mother and the surrogate shall have a 
domicile or habitual residence in Cyprus. The rationale of this rule is to avoid reproductive tourism. Law 
92(I)/2016 introduced an exception to this rule, with a rather limited scope,105 if it is not possible to find a 
surrogate in Cyprus and after a special permission has been granted by the competent board. Even in this 
case, the surrogate must stay in Cyprus from the 28th week of pregnancy until the birth of the child, unless 
this is impossible for medical reasons. Time will show whether this condition is workable in practice. 
In Greece the initial version of the law included a similar provision. It stipulated, namely, that both 
the surrogate and the intended parents should be domiciled in Greece.106 This provision, though, was proven 
to be rather ineffective, since courts were pretty lenient as to the proof of domicile. A residence in Greece 
for a few months, sometimes evidenced by a leasehold agreement, was often considered sufficient.107 In 
July 2014 this restriction was abolished. It is now enough that either the surrogate or the intended mother 
has a domicile or a temporary residence in Greece.108 This development should be embraced, since it 
acknowledges the reality that reproductive tourism is unavoidable,109 as long as the legal framework of 
medically assisted reproduction, and of surrogacy in particular, is in most other countries more restrictive 
than in Greece.110  
Notwithstanding the reservations as to the efficacy of such a condition, legal consideration also arise, 
as to its compatibility with EU law. It is namely questionable whether a law that exempts persons not 
residing in a specific EU country from making use of services provided in another EU country aligns well 
with the freedom to provide services.111 In Luisi and Carbone112 the European Court ruled that medical 
services fall within the freedom to provide services, which is guaranteed not only to service providers but 
also to the recipients of services, even when they have to travel to the country where the services are 
provided in order to enjoy them. It has also stated that persons receiving medical treatment are to be 
                                                 
105 See Art. 7 of Law 92(I)/2016, that amended Art. 23 para. 3 (ε) of Law 69(I)/2015. 
106 See the original version of Art. 8 of Law 3089/2002 und also P. Agallopoulou and A. Koutsouradis (eds.), 
‘Medically Assisted Human Reproduction. The Law 3089/2002. ’ Preparatory Works - Discussions in the Parliament’, 
Sakkoulas, Athens/Thessaloniki 2004, p. 238. 
107 See esp. P. Ravdas, ‘Surrogacy: The Legislator’s Expectations under the Challenge of Statistical Data’ in T. 
Papachristou and E. Kounougeri-Manoledaki (eds.), fn. 82, p. 98 (in Greek); K. Rokas, ‘Greece’ (Chapter 9), in K. 
Trimmings and P. Beaumont (eds.), International Surrogacy Agreements, Hart Publishing, Oxford 2013, pp. 143 ff. 
at157. Cf also K. Davaki, Surrogacy Arrangements in Austerity Greece: Policy Considerations in a Permissive 
Regime, in M. Davies (ed.), fn. 54, pp. 142–159, at p. 146. 
108 See Art. 8 of Law 3089/2002 has been amended by Art. 17 of Law 4272/2014, Government Gazette, Issue Α, nr. 
145 of 11 July 2014. 
109 An indication of the existence of reproductive tourism in Greece is that many medical centers of assisted 
reproduction have internet sites in English, French or German.  
110 See E. Zervogianni, ‘Künstliche Fortpflanzung in Griechenland’ in A. Dutta/ D. Schwab/P. Gottwald/D. 
Henrich/Löhnig  (eds.), fn. 2, pp. 205 ff. at p. 217-218. Cf. Α. Grammaticaki-Alexiou, ‘Fertility Tourism, European Law 
and Conflict of Laws Issues’ in Essays in Honour of Professor Ioannis Voulgaris, Vol. I, Ant. N. Sakkoulas, 
Athens/Komotini 2011, pp. 87 ff. at 95.  
111 See already A. Koutsouradis, ‘Issues on Surrogacy, especially after Law 3305/2005’, Nomiko Vima 2006, 337 ff. 
at 343 ff. (in Greek), who criticized the relevant Greek provision. This issue is also discussed extensively in L. 
Brunet/J. Carruthers/K. Davaki/D. King/C. Marzo/C. McCandless, fn. 1, pp. 142 ff. 
112 Cases C-286/82 and C-26/83 respectively. 
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regarded as recipients of services. Moreover, as the ECJ ruled in the Grogan case,113 the prohibition of a 
specific treatment (termination of pregnancy in the case in question) in one member state does not place 
this service out of the scope of the freedom to provide services. Nowadays Directive 2011/24 on the freedom 
of movement of patients explicitly guarantees the said freedom. The issue that still remains open when it 
comes to surrogacy is rather its legal framing. Who is the patient and who is the service provider? While 
an extensive analysis of this issue exceeds the scope of this paper,114 I believe that the physician performing 
the ivf procedure is the service provider and the intended mother the patient. The use of the surrogate forms 
in this respect part of the treatment of the intended mother’s inability to carry the child herself. 
 
2. The genetic material to be used  
Once surrogacy is permitted, no further questions arise when the gametes to be used are those of the 
intended parents. If this is no longer the case, a series of additional problems are posed. Can the surrogate 
provide her own gametes? In the legal orders where only gestational surrogacy is permitted this is not an 
option.115 If this is not possible, can the ova be provided by a third woman? Greece, Cyprus and Portugal 
provide for ovum donation and answer this question to the affirmative. But what if neither the sperm of the 
intended father cannot be used? Can the intended parents be genetically totally unrelated to the child born 
by the surrogate? It is at this last point that the regulations of the examined jurisdictions diverge. 
Portuguese law explicitly states that surrogacy is possible only if the genetic material of at least one 
of the commissioning parents is used.116 No such restrictions apply in Greek and Cypriot law. The letter of 
Cypriot law is rather straightforward on this point, at least as to the ova.117 In Greece the issue was debated, 
but according to the opinion that finally prevailed no genetic bond is needed between the commissioning 
parents and the child.118 Thus sperm, ova and embryo donation are a legitimate option, if the genetic material 
of the intended parents cannot be used due to medical reasons. It is therefore possible that five persons are 
somehow connected to the birth of the child: the two commissioning parents, the two genetic parents and 
the surrogate. In practice though such cases are seldom.119  
An objection that could be raised to the permissibility of surrogacy when the genetic parents have no 
genetic bonds with the child is that there is no social need for such a possibility, since adoption appears as 
                                                 
113 C- 159/90 esp. paras. 16 ff. 
114 See in more detail L. Brunet/J. Carruthers/K. Davaki/D. King/C. Marzo/C. McCandless, fn. 1, pp. 142-143. 
115 See above section B II 2.  
116 See Art. 8 para. 3 of Law 32/2006. Cf. Israel, where the law provides that the sperm of the intended father must be 
always used. See A. Benshushan/J.G. Schenker, fn. 42, at 1832; J. Hand, fn. 94, at 115. 
117 See Art. 23 para. 3 γ of Law 69(I)/2015. On this issue see also T. Trokanas, fn. 62 at 134-135. 
118 See E. Kounougeri-Manoledaki, fn. 82, p. 54; T. Papachristou, Family Law, P.N. Sakkoulas – Dikaio kai 
Oikonomia, Athens 2014, p. 218; N. Koumoutzis in Georgiades/Stathopoulos (eds.), fn. 69, Art. 1457-1458 nr. 38-
40; D. Papadopoulou-Klamari, fn. 69, pp. 96 and 207; T. Trokanas, fn. 60, p. 375; Ap. Georgiades, fn. 75, § 25 nr. 18; 
cf. P. Agallopoulou, fn. 69, p. 176. This opinion is also followed by case law. See below fn. 119 for the relevant 
statistics. Contra: A. Koutsouradis, fn. 82, at 350, according to whom surrogacy with donated ova is not permitted. 
See further idem, ‘Zum Aktuellen Stand des griechischen Abstammungsrechts’ in A. Spickhoff/D. Schwab/D. 
Henrich/P. Gottwald (eds.), Streit um die Abstammung. Ein europäischer Vergleich, Gieseking Verlag, Bielefeld 2007, 
pp. 205 ff., at p. 245 fn. 113; A. Kotzampasi, ‘The Right to Reproduction: Between the Freedom of Natural 
Reproduction and the Legally Provided Right of Artificial Reproduction’ in A. Kotzampasi, Views and Ideas on Issues 
of Interpretation of Civil Law, City Publish, Thessaloniki 2006, pp. 245 ff. at p. 265-266 (in Greek).  
119 This has been actually the case in the two instances where courts granted authorisation to single men to proceed to 
surrogacy. See above section B III 1 a. According to the study of P. Ravdas, fn. 35, p. 51, donated ova were used in 
around 14% of cases of surrogacy, whereas donated sperm was used in less than 4 % of the cases.  
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a comparable alternative. Setting aside the main conceptual difference between the two options, which is 
that, unlike adoption, in surrogacy the will of the intended parents is the very reason that the child is brought 
to existence, this allegation does not hold true nowadays due to practical reasons. In Western countries the 
children put up for adoption are few while at the same time the number of children that are available for 
international adoption is constantly decreasing.120  
 
IV. The surrogacy agreement  
  
1. The type and form of the surrogacy agreement 
There can be little doubt that the agreement between the commissioning parents and the surrogate is a 
sui generis contract of a strictly personal nature.121 It comes thus a no surprise that, in the jurisdictions that 
regulate surrogacy, special rules are in place as regards the surrogacy agreement. In all three countries 
examined the contracts should concluded in writing.122 Further provisions regulate particular issues of the 
arrangement, such as its content, the parties that are eligible to enter into such an agreement and the gametes 
to that can be used.123 General contract law rules are applicable to the extent no special provision exists and 
provided they are compatible with the nature of the contract. Surprisingly enough, contrary to a common 
belief that the surrogacy agreement is the first step that sets surrogacy in motion, Cypriot and Portuguese 
law, unlike Greek law, provide that the contract is concluded after surrogacy has been authorized by the 
competent body.124 
 
2. Contents of the agreement 
The parties that enter the contract, namely the commissioning parents and the surrogate, agree that the 
latter will carry a child for the former. Depending on the jurisdiction, the law may include further rules on 
the contents of the agreement. 
Setting aside the issue regarding the payment of the surrogate, that has been addressed above,125 the 
parties can draw, in the surrogacy agreement, their rights and obligations in more detail. Unlike Greek law, 
Portuguese and Cypriot law entail specific rules on the minimum content of the agreement. The diversity 
of these provisions illustrate the different concerns that prevailed in the two countries when enacting the 
law on surrogacy. More concretely: 
Cypriot law focuses mainly on three specific issues: First, it provides that the parties shall state in the 
contract that the surrogate will be obliged to hand over the child to the commissioning parents, who will be 
the legal parents of the child and are therefore obliged to take it home, once he/she is born.126 This provision 
appears as rather peculiar, since the interpretation of Cypriot law rather suggests that the decisive element 
for the establishment of legal parenthood is the authorization of surrogacy by the court and not the 
agreement of the parties.127 Second, it explicitly foresees that the agreement shall include provisions on the 
                                                 
120 See the international adoption statistics of the HCCH for the years 2004-2016 at 
https://assets.hcch.net/docs/a8fe9f19-23e6-40c2-855e-388e112bf1f5.pdf.  
121 See T. Trokanas, fn. 69, p. 370, with further references. 
122 For Greece see Art. 1458 GrCC; for Cyprus see Art. 25 of Law 69(I)/2015; for Portugal see Art. 8 para. 10 of Law 
32/2006. 
123 For these issues see above section B III. 
124 See for Cyprus Art. 25 of Law 69(I)/2015 and for Portugal Art. 8 para. 4 of Law 32/2006. 
125 See section B II 1. 
126 See Art. 25 para. 2 α-γ of Law 69(I)/2015.  
127 See Art. 22 paras. 2 and 3 of Law 69(I)/2015 and in detail T. Trokanas, fn. 62, pp. 148 ff. 
Pro Justitia 
τ.1 (2018) 
E-ISSN: 2529-0401 
Available online at https://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/projustitia 
 
 
© 2018 by Author(s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0). See https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 
 
118 
 
costs of the procedure. Namely, it should be stipulated that the commissioning parents cover all pregnancy 
and birth-related expenses, as well as the costs of any post-natal complication. To cover these, the intended 
parents assume the obligation to issue in advance, before the before the embryo transfer, a letter of credit 
to the surrogate as security.128 Third, to avoid complications of Private International Law, the parties have 
to include in their contract the term that the surrogate will remain in the Republic of Cyprus from the 28th 
week of pregnancy until the birth of the child, unless this is not possible due to medical reasons.129 
In Portugal, the President of the Republic vetoed the initial bill of the law on surrogacy on the grounds 
that it did not sufficiently specify the rights and obligations of the parties.130 In this light, Portuguese law 
now explicitly states that the parties shall set out in the contract their rights and obligations and, in particular, 
the way they agree to deal with exceptional contingencies. In this respect it specifically provides that the 
parties shall include provisions in the contract for cases in which the child is diagnosed with a malformation 
or a disease as well as on voluntary abortion.131 Nevertheless, the Portuguese Constitutional Court ruled 
that the said provisions fail to set appropriate limits to what can be agreed upon by the parties and are 
therefore unconstitutional.132 Art. 3 of the Regulatory Decree 6/2017 includes further detailed rules on the 
contents of the surrogacy agreement, that stipulate, among others, that the contract shall state the right of 
the surrogate to choose the doctor that will deliver the baby as well as the place and type of birth; include 
information on the potential risks of the procedure and the changes in the way of life that this brings about; 
recognize the surrogate’s right to psychological support, not only during pregnancy, but also after birth; 
foresee the way to resolve disputes that may arise. In addition, it provides that the intended parents assume 
the obligation to provide health insurance for the surrogate.  
In all jurisdictions examined it is accepted that the contract cannot impose rules that restrict the 
surrogates freedom and dignity exceedingly.133 Thus the surrogate cannot assume the obligation to live with 
the commissioning parents, follow a specific diet or refrain from any activity the commissioning parents 
disapprove of, if this is not considered necessary due to medical reasons. On this basis, it should be also 
accepted that she cannot relinquish her right to decide whether or not to have a (lawful) abortion or undergo 
other medical examinations.134  
  
3. The enforceability of the contract 
Unlike English law,135 (lawful) surrogacy agreements are considered fully binding in Greece, Cyprus 
and Portugal. Nevertheless, given their strictly personal nature and the fact that for their performance at 
least one party (the surrogate) has to undergo medical treatment, certain particularities arise as to their 
enforceability.  
                                                 
128 See Art. 25 para. 2 δ-ε of Law 69(I)/2015. 
129 See Art. 25 para. 2 στ of Law 69(I)/2015. See also Art. 23 para. 3 ε of the same law. 
130 See above section A II.  
131 See Art. 8 para. 10 of Law 32/2006. 
132 See decision 225/2018, fn. 28. For a brief presentation of the main points of the decision in English see T. Violante, 
fn. 29. 
133 See for Greece Art. 179 GrCC (general provision) and in Portugal Art. 8 para. 11 of Law 32/2006 referring to 
surrogacy contracts in particular. In Cyprus, though, this is not straightforward, taking also into consideration the fact 
that the law provides that the court may impose terms to the surrogate to ensure the success of the procedure. See on 
this issue T. Trokanas, fn. 62, pp. 143-144. 
134 See also below section B IV 3. 
135 Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985, section 1A, inserted by section 36 (1) of Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act 1990.  
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First, in Greece it is accepted that any party can withdraw from the surrogacy contract without bearing 
liability any time before the embryo transfer.136 In Portugal the same point of view has been expressed in 
the literature, in the absence of a specific legal provision on this issue.137 
Second, despite the binding character of the surrogacy agreement, the surrogate cannot be forced to 
undergo medical acts against her will. This stems directly from the generally accepted principle that no 
medical act can be lawfully performed on a person without his/her informed consent, which is meant to 
ensure the protection of the patient’s autonomy.138 It should be thus accepted that it is up to the surrogate 
to decide to (legally) abort or to not abort the embryo.139 For the very same reasons, this should also hold 
as to the performance of pre-natal tests, especially, but not only, of those of invasive nature, such as 
amniocentesis. While a claim for damages against the surrogate is not excluded, if her decision is found to 
be in breach of the contract (e.g. unreasonable decision to abort a healthy embryo),140 there is no room for 
specific performance.  
After the child is born the surrogate has to hand it over to the commissioning parents. Nevertheless, in 
the European jurisdictions that regulate surrogacy in a comprehensive way this obligation does not derive 
from the surrogacy agreement itself, but from the legal provisions that establish legal parenthood.141  
 
4. The informed consent of the parties in particular 
The performance of the surrogacy contract presupposes that medical acts will be performed to the 
surrogate. Jurisdictions with a comprehensive regulation on medically assisted reproduction have typically 
special provisions on the consent of the parties to the relevant procedures.142 Specifically as to surrogacy, 
the Greek regulation is particularly comprehensive. 
More concretely, the Code of Ethics of Medically Assisted Reproduction refers in length to the 
information that shall be provided to the persons who wish to have a child using the methods of medically 
assisted reproduction or participate in a method of medically assisted reproduction, the latter being the 
surrogate. This information is not restricted to medical issues, such as the description of the procedure to 
be followed and its risks, but extents to the social, ethical and psychological consequences of the procedures 
to be followed as well.143 Foreigners shall be additionally informed on the Greek legal framework on 
surrogacy. It is only after this information has been provided that the consent of the participants is given in 
                                                 
136 See Ap. Georgiades, fn. 75, § 25 nr. 19 who bases this result on the provisions of the  contract of mandate (Art. 
725-726 GrCC), in combination with Art. 1456 GrCC, that refers to the possibility of the intended parents to revoke 
their consent to medically assisted reproduction.  
137 See V.L. Raposo, fn. 34, p. 232 and 233. 
138 See among many others, N. Forgó, Law and Ethics of Informed Consent, C.H. Beck/Hart/Nomos, Munchen/Oxford 
2013. 
139 For Greece see, Α. Tsalidis, Surrogate Motherhood and Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy, in Assisted 
Reproduction and Alternative Family Forms, 2014, pp. 63-64 (in Greek) with further references. For Portugal see 
above fn. 131-132, as well as V.L. Raposo, fn. 34, p. 233. 
140 See above fn. 139. 
141 See for Greece Art. 1464 GrCC; for Cyprus see above fn. 127; for Portugal see Art. 8 para. 7 of Law 32/2006. See 
also below section B VI 1.  
142 For Greece see Art. 1456 GrCC and in more detail below. Cyprus see Art. 16 para. 4 of Law 69(I)/2015; for 
Portugal see Art. 14 of Law 32/2006. See also the model consent form prepared by the Portuguese Authority of 
Medically Assisted Reproduction (Conselho Nacional de Procriação Medicamente Assistida), available at: 
http://www.cnpma.org.pt/cnpma_documentacao.aspx.  
143 See Art. 5 of the Code of Ethics. 
Pro Justitia 
τ.1 (2018) 
E-ISSN: 2529-0401 
Available online at https://ejournals.lib.auth.gr/projustitia 
 
 
© 2018 by Author(s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0). See https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 
 
120 
 
writing.144A special consent of the surrogate is necessary regarding the number of embryos that will be 
transferred to her, after she has been informed about the risks of multiple pregnancy.145  
While all abovementioned provisions are undoubtedly in the correct direction, I believe that the 
interests of all parties would be best safeguarded, if the relevant information were not provided by the 
doctor that will perform the relevant medical procedure, but by an independent party.146 
 
V. Control mechanisms 
The preceding analysis has shown that countries that do proceed to a comprehensive regulation of 
surrogacy make its permissibility contingent upon many conditions. In order to ensure that these conditions 
are fulfilled, and in general in order to monitor the relevant practices, they provide for control mechanisms. 
In what follows, I refer to three common elements in the jurisdictions under examination, namely, to the 
authorization of surrogacy by a competent body, to the establishment of a national authority that oversees 
medically assisted reproduction and to the criminalization of procedures that do not satisfy the conditions 
of the law. While the first of these elements constitutes a particularity of jurisdictions that regulate 
surrogacy, the second and third are present in most jurisdictions that regulate medically assisted 
reproduction in general, irrespective of their stance as to surrogacy and are therefore presented briefly. 
 
1. Authorization of surrogacy by a competent body 
Although all jurisdictions examined provide for the authorization of surrogacy by a competent body 
prior to the embryo transfer,147 the regulations differ in their particulars, especially as to the complexity of 
the procedure and the scope of control.  
In Greece the commissioning parents apply for a court order that authorizes surrogacy. The procedure 
is non-adversarial and the judge is bound to authorize surrogacy if he/she is satisfied that all the conditions 
set by the law are met.148 Thus the court screens not only medical necessity but also the age of the 
commissioning parents, the suitability of the surrogate and the agreement of the parties. 
In Portugal and in Cyprus the authorization procedure is rather complex, involving two bodies. In 
Portugal the law provides that the surrogacy arrangement is authorized by the National Council of 
Medically Assisted Reproduction, which, before deciding, has to get the non-binding opinion of the 
Portuguese Association of Doctors.149 The Regulatory Decree 6/2017 provides further details for this 
procedure.150 Given the deadlines set in this regulation the authorization procedure can take up to 6 months. 
The fact that authorization of surrogacy is granted before the conclusion of the contract on surrogacy, 
concerns may raise concerns as to the protection of the interests of the surrogate, given that the contents of 
                                                 
144 See Art. 6 para. 1 and 2 of the Code of Ethics. 
145 See Art. 6 para. 3 of the Code of Ethics. Special rules are in place to limit such instances: Art. 6 of Law 3305/2005 
defines the number of embryos that may be transferred to a woman depending on her age. Art. 12 of the Code of 
Ethics describes the measures the IVF unit shall undertake to minimize the number of multiple pregnancies. 
146 Cf. in this respect §7962 (b) of the 2017 California Family Code that stipulates that “Prior to executing the written 
assisted reproduction agreement for gestational carriers, a surrogate and the intended parent or intended parents 
shall be represented by separate independent licensed attorneys of their choosing”.  
147 For Greece see Art. 1458 GrCC; for Cyprus see Arts. 23 and 24 of Law 69(I)/2015 and for Art. 8 para. 4 of Law 
32/2006.  
148 See Art. 799 GrCCP. Αccording to Art. 744 GrCCP, the Court has the power to investigate ex officio if the 
conditions of surrogacy are fulfilled. 
149 See Art. 8 para. 4 of Law 32/2006. 
150 See Art. 2 of Regulatory Decree 6/2017. 
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the contract are not controlled ex ante. The law explicitly stipulates, however, that the National Council of 
Medically Assisted Reproduction oversees the whole procedure.151  
The Cypriot legislation provides a more intense control on surrogacy. The intended parents have to 
apply for surrogacy first to the Council of Medically Assisted Reproduction.152 If their application is 
successful, they then have to apply for a court order.153 The court grants the permission, if the conditions of 
the law are met. In addition, it can impose specific terms to the surrogate to in order to ensure the success 
of the procedure.154 It is only after this court ruling that the surrogate and the commissioning parents can 
conclude the surrogacy agreement.155 Setting aside the evident delays in the procedure that arise because of 
the double authorization of surrogacy, the Cypriot approach can be criticized in that the final arrangement 
between the commissioning parents and the surrogate does not actually undergo any review. As it has been 
correctly pointed out, the court ruling should be the last, rather than the middle, step in the relevant 
procedure.156  
The Portuguese and Cypriot regulations, despite their complexity, present an advantage over the Greek 
one, in that specialists from fields other than just law, such as doctors and psychologists participate in the 
authorization procedure itself.157 
 
2. Establishment of a national authority that oversees medically assisted reproduction 
The establishment of a special statutory authority overseeing medically assisted reproduction is a 
wide-spread option in most countries with a relevant regulation.158 A common characteristic of these 
authorities in the three jurisdictions examined is their multidisciplinary composition, including among 
others, lawyers, doctors and phycologists.159 What differs are their competences. In Greece, for instance, 
the National Authority of Assisted Reproduction, is an independent authority, the main responsibilities of 
which lie on the oversight of the implementation of the legal framework on medically assisted reproduction, 
the issue of regulations on special issues, as well as the submission of proposals for the amendment of the 
current provisions.160 In Cyprus and in Portugal the relevant council may also authorize, and in case of 
Portugal also oversee, individual medical procedures, such as surrogacy.161  
 
                                                 
151 See Art. 8 para. 4 of Law 32/2006. 
152 See Art. 23 of Law 69(I)/2015. 
153 See Art. 24 of Law 69(I)/2015. 
154 Ibid. On this issue see also T. Trokanas, fn. 62, pp. 143-144. 
155 See Art. Art. 25 of Law 69(I)/2015. 
156 See T. Trokanas, fn. 62, pp. 147-148. 
157 See below section B V 2, referring to the composition of Cypriot and Portuguese Authorities of Medically Assisted 
Reproduction. 
158 It is worth noting that the UK has been the first country to establish such a statutory authority, namely the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. In France this body is the Biomedical Agency (Agence de la biomédecine) 
and in Spain the National Commission of Assisted Human Reproduction (Comisión Nacional de Reproducción 
Humana Asistida). 
159 For Greece see Art. 21 of Law 3305/2005; for Cyprus see Art. 5 para. 2 of Law 69(I)/2015; for Portugal see Art. 
31 of Law 32/2006. 
160 See Arts. 19 and 20 of Law 3305/2005. 
161 See above section B V 1.  
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3. Criminalization of procedures 
The intense criminalization of medically assisted reproduction procedures that do not comply with the 
legal provisions is a usual complement to the regulation of surrogacy162 and can be seen as a sign of 
weakness in the enforcement of the relevant legal framework. That notwithstanding, the efficacy of this 
approach can be questioned, since in practice in many jurisdictions seem reluctant to actually apply the 
criminal provisions. In Greece in particular no relevant published judgment could be retrieved.  
 
VI. Consequences of surrogacy 
1. Legal parenthood at the time of birth 
When it comes to the legal parenthood of the child at the time of birth, the lawmaker who drafts 
regulation of surrogacy is confronted with two options: The first one is to hold on to the roman rule “Mater 
semper certa est”, in which case the surrogate is the legal mother of the child, while the intended parents 
can acquire parental rights by means of a subsequent legal act, similar to adoption, such as the parental 
order of English law.163 In this option the balance is evidently tipped in favour of the surrogate. It protects 
the surrogate’s interests if she does not wish to give up the child, while it renders the intended parents 
vulnerable to the possibility of exploitation. The latter concern is addressed in Israeli law by means of a 
special provision, according to which as soon as the child is born, he/she is placed under legal guardianship, 
and it is the guardian, and not the surrogate, who grants the necessary consent for the adoption.164 Another 
problem that may arise in cases the surrogate is the legal mother of the child at the time of birth is that 
intended parents can escape the obligations that arise out of the surrogacy arrangement if they no longer 
wish to take care of the child, as it may be the case if he/she suffers from serious health conditions. The 
Baby Gammy case165 is just an illustration of the severity of the problems that may arise. 
The second option is to allow for the assignment of the child to the intended parents already at the 
time of birth. This option does away with legal uncertainty, since no transfer of parenthood takes place. The 
rights and obligations of the intended parents as legal parents of the child arise already at birth. The 
surrogate is not faced with a dilemma as to whether to hand the child over to the commissioning parents or 
not. This option is often confronted with scepticism.166 Nevertheless, in gestational surrogacy, performed 
under a regulatory framework that ensures ex ante the protection of the surrogate’s interests, and if the 
interests of the child born are also thrown into the equation, I believe this solution is preferable. Indeed the 
Greek, Cypriot and Portuguese legislator adopted this option.167  
Specifically in Greece the legal parenthood of the intended parents is contingent upon the court ruling 
that has authorized surrogacy. If such a ruling exists, the intended mother becomes by law the mother is the 
child.168 This is also decisive for the establishment of legal fatherhood.169 The same seems to be the case in 
Cyprus, although, according to the law, provisions on parenthood are also included in the contract between 
                                                 
162 See e.g. above fn. 32. 
163 See above fn. 57. 
164 See A. Benshushan/J.G. Schenker, fn. 33, p. 1833; L. Ben-Nun, fn. 33, p. 69. 
165 See, for instance, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/04/baby-gammy-conflicting-reports-about-baby-
boy-abandoned-in-thailand.  
166 See the Report of the UN Special Rapporteur, fn. 10, esp. para. 72. 
167 See above fn. 141 and in more detail below.  
168 See Art. 1464 GrCC. 
169 See Arts. 1465 ff. GrCC and in more detail E. Zervogianni, The Changing Concept of Family and Challenges for 
Family Law in Greece, in J. Scherpe (ed)., European Family Law, Vol. 2, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2016, pp. 86 ff., 
at pp. 96-98.  
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the commissioning parents and the surrogate.170 Finally, in Portugal the law explicitly stipulates that the 
intended parents are the legal parents of the child.171 The phrasing of the provision seems to imply that this 
is the case even if the surrogacy arrangement is void.172 Currently though, the legal situation in Portugal is 
uncertain, because the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional the provision that grants legal 
parenthood directly to the commissioning parents already at the time of birth, on the grounds that it does 
not grant the surrogate the possibility to reconsider, after the child is born.173  
Unlike Portugal, in Greece and in Cyprus legal motherhood can be contested within 6 months from 
birth, if it is proved than the ovum that has been actually fertilized has been of the surrogate.174 This instance 
may arise either due to natural reasons, if the surrogate had sexual relations with a partner around the time 
of embryo transfer, or be the result of traditional surrogacy, against the provisions of the law. If the claim 
of the surrogate is accepted, then the only possibility for the intended parents to become legal parents of 
the child is through adoption. In this case a practical and a legal problem may arise. First, adoption requires 
the consent of legal parents of the child to be adopted, so it is in practice highly questionable whether a 
surrogate who has contested legal motherhood would grant her consent to adoption. Irrespective of this, the 
legitimacy of adoption itself could be challenged in such cases on the grounds that it in effect would 
constitute an evasion of the law.175 Nevertheless, in Greece the rather prevailing opinion in the literature 
accepts adoption as a legitimate option, arguing that this undoubtedly serves best interests of the child.176  
 
2. Right to contact?  
Greek law, and presumably also Cypriot law, do not provide for any right of the surrogate over the 
child, such as the right to contact.177 Even if a relevant provision had been inserted in the surrogacy 
                                                 
170 See above fn. 127. 
171 See Art. 8 para. 7 of Law 32/2006. 
172 See V.L. Raposo, fn. 34, p. 231, referring to the Interpretive Statement of CNPMA of July 2016 available at: 
http://www.cnpma.org.pt/Docs/CNPMA_DeclaracaoInterpretativa_SET2016.pdf.  
173 Decision 225/2018, above fn. 28. On this issue in English see T. Violante, fn. 29. For relevant considerations prior 
to the decision of the Constitutional Court see V.L. Raposo, fn. 34, pp. 232 ff. , esp. pp. 233-234.  
174 For Greece see Art. 1464 para. 2 GrCC; for Cyprus see Art. 25 para. 5 of Law 69(I)/2015 as well as Art. 22 para. 
2 a of the same law. See also T. Trokanas, fn. 62, pp. 151-152 on the legal issues that arise because of the rather 
unfortunate phrasing of the Cypriot provision.  
175 On this issue, referring to Greek law see T. Papachristou, Artificial Reproduction in the Civil Code, Sakkoulas, 
Athens/Thessaloniki 2003, pp. 75-76 (in Greek); cf. F. Skorini-Paparrigopoulou, Comment to the Decision 
31/5803/176/1999 of the Multi-member Court of First Instance of Heraklion, Nomiko Vima 2000, 495 ff, at. 498 (in 
Greek); K. Pantelidou, ‘Issues of the Νew Institution of “Surrogate” Motherhood’, Harmenopoulos 2004, 977 ff., 984 
(in Greek).  
176 See Decision 122/2008 of the Single-member Court of First Instance of Heraklion, Legal Database Intrasoft-
Nomos; F. Skorini-Paparrigopoulou in Ap. Georgiades and M. Stathopoulos (eds.), fn. 69, Art. 1463-1464 nr. 50; E. 
Pournaras, in Ap. Georgiades (ed.), Brief Commentary of the Civil Code, fn. 69, Art. 1463-1464 nr. 9; I. Spyridakis, 
Family Law, fn. 69, p. 431 fn. 2; E. Kounougeri-Manoledaki, fn. 69, pp. 99 ff.; idem, Artificial Reproduction and 
Family Law, 2nd ed., Sakkoulas, Athens/Thessaloniki 2005, pp. 110-111 (in Greek); Ap. Georgiades, fn. 75, § 28 nr. 
3; cf. P. Agallopoulou, , ‘Surrogacy’, Digesta 2004, 1 ff. at 12 (in Greek). 
177 For Greece see K. Rokas, fn. 107, p. 151.  
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arrangement, it is questionable if it would be deemed enforceable, since the legal parents have the sole 
competence to make decisions on the upbringing of their child.178 
From the perspective of the child, in Greece and in Cyprus there exist no specific rules granting the 
child the right to access the information on surrogacy. The child’s right to acquire such information could 
be grounded on the right to know one’s genetic origins.179 Both the Greek and Cypriot legislator, though, 
have opted for the anonymity of donors of genetic material. It thus seems, that, upon deciding this issue, 
they apparently concluded that the protection of the so-called ‘social family’ outweighs the child’s right to 
gain knowledge over his/her genetic origins.180 In Greece this legislative choice has been rightly criticized 
in the literature181 but has not been legally challenged before any court yet.  
A similar approach had been initially adopted in Portugal, but the Constitutional Court182 declared the 
legal provisions on the anonymity of donors and of the surrogate183 unconstitutional.184 It further maintained 
that the relations between the surrogate and the child do not discontinue after surrogacy. Contact could be 
limited, however, taking into account possible risks of psychological nature to the child. Moreover, the 
Court ruled that the right of the child to know the identity of the surrogate is derived from his/her rights to 
personal identity and to free development of personality.185 
 
C. CONCLUSIONS: THE CHANCES AND THE PITFALLS 
Surrogacy is a reality and as long as there are persons who cannot have children in a different way, 
this will not change. Social acceptance of surrogacy is growing but the lawmakers in most countries are 
reluctant to introduce a relevant regulatory scheme. Certainly surrogacy raises various concerns, but, 
                                                 
178 This is definitively so in Greece. See Art. 1510 ff. GrCC on the right of parental care. On the contents of this right 
see in detail P. Agallopoulou in Ap. Georgiades and M. Stathopoulos (eds.), Commentary of the Civil Code, Vol. VIII, 
2nd ed., P.N. Sakkoulas - Dikaio kai Oikonomia, Athens 2003, Art. 1510 nr. 80 ff. (in Greek). 
179 See K. Rokas, fn. 107, p. 150. 
180 For Greece see Art. 1460 GrCC. For Cyprus see Art. 33 of Law 69(I)/2015.  
181 See Ch. Stampelou’s opinion in P. Agallopoulou/A. Koutsouradis (eds.), fn. 106, p. 59 (in Greek); idem, in Ap. 
Georgiades and M. Stathopoulos, above fn. 69, Art. 1460 nr. 6 ff.; idem, ‘The Anonymity of the Donor of Genetic 
Material’ in Current Tendencies in Family Law, Nomiki Vivliothiki, Athens 2013, p. 16 ff., esp. p. 31 (in Greek); P. 
Agallopoulou, ‘Medically Assisted Human Reproduction and Anonymity of the Third Donor of Genetic Material’ in 
Essays in Honour of Michael P. Stathopoulos, Vol. I, Ant. N. Sakkoulas, Athens/Komotini 2010, pp. 1 ff., at p. 19 (in 
Greek); cf. A. Kotzampasi, ‘The Anonymity of the Donor in Artificial Reproduction as a Legal and Moral Question’, 
Harmenopoulos 2000, 710 ff. at 716 (in Greek); G. Lekkas, ‘Medically Assisted Reproduction and Kinship in Greek 
Law. Introduction of ‘Social-Emotional Kinship or Reproduction without Kinship?’ in T. Papachristou and E. 
Kounougeri-Manoledaki (eds.), fn. 82, pp. 65-66 (in Greek); E. Zervogianni, above fn. 110, at p. 227-228. Contra (in 
favour of anonymity); K. Fountedaki, ‘The Information of the Child that has been Born by Heterologous Artificial 
Reproduction about his Descent’ in Artificial Reproduction and Genetic Technology: The Moral-Legal Dimension, 
Publications of the Association of Jurist of North Greece, Vol. 48, Thessaloniki 2003, p. 129 ff., esp. p. 138 (in Greek); 
E. Kounougeri-Manoledaki, above fn. 69, pp. 86-87; T. Papachristou, above fn. 118, p. 222; cf. also T. Vidalis, Life 
without a Face, Ant. N. Sakkoulas, Athens/Komotini 2003, pp. 153 ff., esp. at p. 159 (in Greek).  
182 See above fn. 28. 
183 See Art. 15 Law 25/2016 of Law 32/2006. 
184 See on this point also the conclusions of the Report of the UN Special Rapporteur, fn. 10, para. 73. 
185 Cf. on this point also the English Guidelines on Surrogacy, addressed to intended parents, published by the 
Department of Health and Social Care, available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/684259/surrogacy
-guidance-for-healthcare-professionals.pdf, at point 7, call on relevant research and advise parents to inform the child 
that he/she has been born through surrogacy. 
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equally certainly, the lack of legislative initiative in this field leads to a series of thorny problems. A 
comprehensive regulation of surrogacy is the way forward; not because pragmatism overrides ethics, but 
because a good regulation, one that balances the interests of all parties involved, not only on paper but also 
in practice, can successfully address most of the concerns about surrogacy. 
In my opinion, the main points around which such a regulation should revolve are given by the 
structure of the preceding analysis itself: allow for gestational surrogacy only,186 in cases of medical 
necessity; set eligibility criteria for both the intended parents and the surrogate; provide for monitoring 
mechanisms that oversee the whole process; do away with uncertainty as to legal parenthood.  
Specifically, to best safeguard the interests of the surrogate, it is essential to place emphasis on the ex 
ante aspects of the regulation, namely on the conditions of surrogacy. Detailed provisions on the 
characteristics of the surrogate (her age, physical and psychological well-being, understanding of the 
obligations she is assuming, which can be guaranteed when she has already had children of her own) can 
serve greatly to this aim. It is also essential that the surrogate is duly informed on all steps of the procedure. 
The authorization of the surrogacy arrangement by a competent authority is also of utmost importance. In 
order to safeguard the interests of the child, it is necessary to set criteria regarding the eligibility of the 
parents. While the question whether surrogacy is commissioned by couples or single persons, as well as 
their sex, seems to me immaterial, provisions especially on the age of the commissioning parents are of 
relevance.  
A central feature of a comprehensive regulatory scheme on surrogacy should be the establishment of 
the legal parenthood of the intended parents already at the time of birth of the child. The adoption of this 
approach presents the undeniable advantage of legal certainty. Moreover, it serves best the interest of all 
parties involved, and not only of the intended parents. The child is prevented from becoming the object of 
a dispute, or even of a transaction, while also the surrogate, from the beginning, can come to terms with the 
fact that she will have to hand over the child. Besides, the justification of rules that make the handing over 
of the child to the commissioning parents contingent upon the decision of the surrogate after birth is seems 
inadequate in case of gestational surrogacy, especially if there exist genetic bonds between the child and 
(at least one of) the commissioning parents.  
All jurisdictions with a comprehensive regulatory scheme for surrogacy examined in this paper, 
address these points quite similarly and could be used as patterns. In my opinion, the Greek regulation, 
though not perfect, is the more balanced one and, being in force for more than 15 years, has already a 
success story to tell. Hundreds of children have been born by surrogates, while surrogacy itself is well 
accepted by the Greek society, without substantial objections of moral, religious, political or other 
character.187 The Cypriot and Portuguese regulations have surely enriched the analysis with interesting ideas 
in particular issues, especially as to the contents of the contract. 
Finally, when drafting the regulatory framework of surrogacy the lawmaker should stay clear of the 
following pitfalls:  
First, a regulation that is too restrictive (e.g. because it permits surrogacy only among relatives or 
because of too complicated authorization procedures) is ineffective, since it may work as a covered 
                                                 
186 The reason I plead for gestational surrogacy only is interrelated with legal parenthood of the intended parents 
already at the time of birth. See above section B VI 1.  
187 See on this point the empirical study of K. Panagos, Surrogacy. Greek Legal Regime and Criminological 
Extensions, Sakkoulas, Athens/Thessaloniki 2011, p. 133 ff. (in Greek), performed on 120 students of Aristotle 
University of Thessaloniki. Cf. however Z. Papaligoura/D. Papadatou/T. Bellali, fn. 42, at 117 that mention that, 
although the birth of the child through the surrogate is very welcomed in the family, surrogacy is still associated with 
social stigmatization. 
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prohibition of surrogacy, providing intended parents with incentives to travel abroad for reproductive 
purposes. The Cypriot and Portuguese raise some concerns in this respect, but it is the experience in practice 
that will show whether they are workable or not  
 Second, the legislator should ensure the applicability of the rules set. Practically unenforceable rules, 
such as rules on the altruistic character of surrogacy, drive surrogacy arrangements to the black market, 
where no control, and thus no protection of the parties, is possible. As stated above,188 it is better to allow 
for an agreement granting a reasonable compensation to the surrogate for her services, which will be 
controlled by a competent authority and will be enforceable, than prohibit it, rendering vulnerable either 
the surrogate, if she has received her compensation upfront, or , in the reverse case, the intended parents. 
The same concerns hold also for territorial restrictions, which seem to be anyway incompatible with the 
freedom of (medical) services in the European Union. 
In an overall assessment, I believe that the introduction of a comprehensive regulatory scheme is the 
globally responsible way to deal with surrogacy. The costs of the lawmakers’ inertia at a national level in 
Western countries are externalized to the surrogates in developing countries as well as to the children born 
out of these procedures. The enactment of a well-balanced regulation can put a stop to exploitation and this 
is a step a democratic society should proceed to. 
                                                 
188 See section B II 1.  
